Sh4mefulIP Address: 178.90.109.129
Dormant. IP address 178.90.109.129 is registered to Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration and geolocates to Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan. It was observed in sh4meful's dataset on June 1, 2026. Over the observation window, it has failed DMARC alignment once, targeting one sender domain. Its reverse DNS resolves to 178.90.109.129.dynamic.telecom.kz. Network context: this address sits within GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT (Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration), a network sh4meful has observed producing 8 failures across 8 distinct IPs during the same window.
Failure Activity Over Time
Peak activity was observed in the week of June 1, 2026 with 13 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window declined sharply compared with the prior period (0 vs 13 failures).
This IP has claimed to send from 1 sender domain monitored by sh4meful. The single targeted domain suggests either a compromised sending source or a spoofing attempt focused on a specific brand.
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- KZ Kazakhstan
- Region:
- Jetisu Region
- City:
- Taldykorgan
- Coordinates:
- 45.0142, 78.3717
WHOIS Information
- Network Name:
- GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT
- CIDR:
178.90.96.0/20- Owner:
- Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration
- Reverse DNS:
-
178.90.109.129.dynamic.telecom.kz
Last updated: 6/2/2026
Analysis
This IP generated 13 messages that triggered DMARC failures on June 1, 2026, all within a single day. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a reject disposition, refusing delivery outright.
The reverse DNS record (178.90.109.129.dynamic.telecom.kz) matches a generic ISP address pattern, typical of consumer or small-business connections rather than dedicated mail infrastructure. Mail originating from addresses like this is frequently associated with compromised endpoints, such as home routers, IoT devices, or infected personal computers being used as part of a botnet.
Geolocation places the host in Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan, on infrastructure operated by Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration. Abuse-reporting channels exist in this jurisdiction but historical response rates are inconsistent, meaning remediation is more often handled through receiver-side blocking than provider-side takedown.
The address is registered to Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration (GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT). Enterprise-registered addresses that appear in DMARC failure data are typically either compromised hosts on the organization's network or outbound mail relays that are not properly authorized in the domain's SPF record.
Across the wider GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT network, 8 distinct IPs have been associated with 8 authentication failures over 25 observed messages, spanning 1 country. The failure pattern suggests a mix of abuse sources on this network.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, treat it as probable spoofing. Verify that your SPF record does not authorize this host, directly or through nested include mechanisms, and that no DKIM selector you publish has been issued to it. If both checks come back clean, the receiver's reject action is doing its job.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for Kazakhtelecom Data Network Administration is listed in RIPE WHOIS records, though response rates from this jurisdiction are inconsistent.
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):
Recommended Action
If this IP appears in your own DMARC reports, treat it as an unauthorized sender unless you have specifically verified it as a legitimate service you use. Ensure your DMARC policy is at p=quarantine or p=reject to prevent delivery of messages this IP claims to send from your domain. If you're new to DMARC, our complete guide walks through the mechanics.