DMARC Spoof Detection, Kazakhstan
Clear Clear FilterThis page shows DMARC authentication failures originating from Kazakhstan. Learn more about this data.
Failures (Filtered)
59
IPs (Filtered)
58
Networks (Filtered)
32
Messages (Filtered)
73
Analysis
Kazakhstan has contributed 58 unique IP addresses across 59 failed authentication events, accounting for 73 messages across 32 networks. Activity spans from November 13, 2024 to May 25, 2026. The most active networks are GPON_FTTH_SERVICES, KZ-NLS, and RIPE.
Failures
Showing 1-10 of 59 failures, affecting 73 messages| Date โผ | Source IP | Country | City | Network | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5/25/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 | ||
| 5/25/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Shymkent | 1 | ||
| 4/15/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Karaganda | 1 | ||
| 4/9/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Petropavl | 3 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Shymkent | 4 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Almaty | 1 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Shymkent | 2 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Pavlodar | 1 | ||
| 4/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Kostanay | 1 |