DMARC Spoof Detection, Kazakhstan

Ten most active networks sourcing DMARC failures from Kazakhstan:

GPON_FTTH_SERVICES and GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT together account for 31% of failure volume from this country. Distribution across many networks is consistent with commodity spoofing infrastructure operating from this geography.

Peak activity was observed in the week of August 3, 2026 with 33 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window declined sharply compared with the prior period (0 vs 40 failures).

Compared with peer geographies in Central Asia, Kazakhstan's failure volume is above the regional median. Countries in this region collectively contributed 3% of failures observed.

Country-level patterns don't imply that mail from Kazakhstan is inherently malicious. Many failures reflect misconfigured legitimate senders, forwarded messages that break authentication, or automated infrastructure operating without authorization. Domain owners investigating a specific failure should look at the source IP and network details rather than the country alone. Our DMARC guide explains how to interpret these signals in your own reports.