DMARC Spoof Detection, Morocco
ClearClear FilterThis page shows DMARC authentication failures originating from Morocco. Learn more about this data.
Morocco accounts for 19 DMARC authentication failures observed by sh4meful over the observation window, sourced from 19 distinct IP addresses across 8 networks. This represents approximately 0.4% of total failure volume observed. Activity from Morocco has held roughly steady over the last 30 days. The most active source is ADSL_Maroc_telecom with 9 failures across 9 IP addresses.
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Top Networks in Morocco
Ten most active networks sourcing DMARC failures from Morocco:
| Network | Organization | Failures | Distinct IPs | Top City |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ADSL_Maroc_telecom | — | 9 | 9 | Marrakesh |
| Mobile_Costumers | — | 2 | 2 | Casablanca |
| WHOIS_LOOKUP_FAILED | — | 1 | 1 | Kenitra |
| MarocTelecomASDL | — | 1 | 1 | Agadir |
| CASA_4G_MarocTelecom | — | 1 | 1 | Casablanca |
| ADSL-4G-SERVICES | — | 1 | 1 | Agadir |
| WANA-INWI-IPv4-2014 | — | 1 | 1 | Casablanca |
| IAM | — | 1 | 1 | Tangier |
ADSL_Maroc_telecom and Mobile_Costumers together account for 67% of failure volume from this country. Concentration in a small number of networks suggests targeted infrastructure rather than diffuse compromise.
Failure Activity Over Time
Peak activity was observed in the week of July 6, 2026 with 1 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window held roughly steady compared with the prior period (0 vs 0 failures).
Regional Context
Compared with peer geographies in Northern Africa, Morocco's failure volume is above the regional median. Countries in this region collectively contributed 1% of failures observed.
Failures
Showing 1-10 of 19 failures, affecting 58 messages| Date ▼ | Source IP | Country | City | Network | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7/11/2026 | MA Morocco | Agadir | N/A | 1 | |
| 4/6/2026 | MA Morocco | Marrakesh | N/A | 4 | |
| 1/15/2026 | MA Morocco | Meknes | 4 | ||
| 10/15/2025 | MA Morocco | Fes | 2 | ||
| 7/3/2025 | MA Morocco | Agadir | 4 | ||
| 6/30/2025 | MA Morocco | Casablanca | 3 | ||
| 6/26/2025 | MA Morocco | Casablanca | 1 | ||
| 6/23/2025 | MA Morocco | Tétouan | 1 | ||
| 6/12/2025 | MA Morocco | Marrakesh | 4 | ||
| 6/11/2025 | MA Morocco | Casablanca | 4 | ||
| 6/10/2025 | MA Morocco | Nador | 4 | ||
| 4/21/2025 | MA Morocco | Casablanca | 4 | ||
| 4/4/2025 | MA Morocco | Marrakesh | 4 | ||
| 3/2/2025 | MA Morocco | Marrakesh | 4 | ||
| 2/15/2025 | MA Morocco | Fes | 4 | ||
| 2/13/2025 | MA Morocco | Casablanca | 4 | ||
| 11/19/2024 | MA Morocco | Kenitra | N/A | 4 | |
| 7/1/2024 | MA Morocco | Agadir | 1 | ||
| 5/3/2024 | MA Morocco | Tangier | 1 |
What This Means
Country-level patterns don't imply that mail from Morocco is inherently malicious. Many failures reflect misconfigured legitimate senders, forwarded messages that break authentication, or automated infrastructure operating without authorization. Domain owners investigating a specific failure should look at the source IP and network details rather than the country alone. Our DMARC guide explains how to interpret these signals in your own reports.