Sh4mefulIP Address: 93.84.102.136
Dormant. IP address 93.84.102.136 is registered to the hosting provider and geolocates to Minsk, Belarus. It first appeared in sh4meful's dataset on July 4, 2025 and was most recently observed on July 8, 2025. Over the observation window, it has failed DMARC alignment 3 times across 2 distinct sender domains. Its reverse DNS resolves to smtp.vsu.by.
Failure Activity Over Time
This IP has claimed to send from 2 sender domains monitored by sh4meful. The narrow domain set is consistent with a targeted spoofing pattern.
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- BY Belarus
- Region:
- Minsk City
- City:
- Minsk
- Coordinates:
- 53.901, 27.5707
WHOIS Information
No WHOIS data available
Analysis
This IP generated DMARC authentication failures across 4 messages in a short window between July 4, 2025 and July 8, 2025. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a quarantine disposition, routing messages to spam or junk folders.
The reverse DNS record (smtp.vsu.by) suggests the host is configured as mail infrastructure. In the context of authentication failures, this most often indicates either a misconfigured legitimate sender or a compromised mail server being used to relay abuse.
Geolocation places the host in Minsk, Belarus, within infrastructure operated by the hosting provider. Sanctions, regional routing policies, and limited abuse-response channels in this jurisdiction mean upstream takedown through the provider is typically slow or unavailable. Receiver-side filtering is the most reliable mitigation.
The network ownership for this address is not clearly identified in available registry data. This can occur for recently allocated blocks, private-use ranges, or addresses whose WHOIS records have not yet been processed.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, treat it as probable spoofing. Verify that your SPF record does not authorize this host, directly or through nested include mechanisms, and that no DKIM selector you publish has been issued to it. If both checks come back clean, the receiver's quarantine action is doing its job.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for the hosting provider is listed in RIPE WHOIS records, though response from this jurisdiction is typically slow or unavailable due to regional routing policies.
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):
Recommended Action
If this IP appears in your own DMARC reports, treat it as an unauthorized sender unless you have specifically verified it as a legitimate service you use. Ensure your DMARC policy is at p=quarantine or p=reject to prevent delivery of messages this IP claims to send from your domain. If you're new to DMARC, our complete guide walks through the mechanics.