IP Address: 87.106.44.67
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- GB United Kingdom
- Coordinates:
- 51.4964, -0.1224
WHOIS Information
No WHOIS data available
Analysis
This IP generated 4 messages that triggered DMARC failures on July 11, 2025, all within a single day. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a quarantine disposition, routing messages to spam or junk folders.
The reverse DNS record resolves to 87-106-44-67.hinet-ip.hinet.net. Whether this represents legitimate mail infrastructure depends on whether the hostname aligns with the domains this address is claiming to send on behalf of.
Geolocation places the host in United Kingdom, on infrastructure operated by the hosting provider. Abuse-reporting channels in this jurisdiction are generally responsive, and reports to the network operator can result in timely remediation.
The network ownership for this address is not clearly identified in available registry data. This can occur for recently allocated blocks, private-use ranges, or addresses whose WHOIS records have not yet been processed.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, treat it as probable spoofing. Verify that your SPF record does not authorize this host, directly or through nested include mechanisms, and that no DKIM selector you publish has been issued to it. If both checks come back clean, the receiver's quarantine action is doing its job.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for the hosting provider is listed in RIPE WHOIS records, and timely remediation is achievable through that channel.
External Reputation Lookups
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