IP Address: 62.60.130.125
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- IR Iran
- Region:
- Tehran
- City:
- Tehran
- Coordinates:
- 35.6824, 51.4158
WHOIS Information
- Network Name:
- spaceshipnetworks
- CIDR:
62.60.130.0/24- Owner:
- ORG-COD1-RIPE
Analysis
This IP generated DMARC authentication failures across 4 messages in a short window between May 11, 2026 and May 12, 2026. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a reject disposition, refusing delivery outright.
The address has no reverse DNS record. Legitimate mail infrastructure almost always publishes a PTR record, because major receivers (Gmail, Microsoft 365, Yahoo) penalize or reject mail without one, and because it is a baseline operational hygiene expectation. Its absence, combined with authentication failure, is consistent with a host being used to originate spoofed mail rather than one misconfigured by a legitimate operator.
Geolocation places the host in Tehran, Iran, within infrastructure operated by ORG-COD1-RIPE. Sanctions, regional routing policies, and limited abuse-response channels in this jurisdiction mean upstream takedown through the provider is typically slow or unavailable. Receiver-side filtering is the most reliable mitigation.
The address is registered to ORG-COD1-RIPE (spaceshipnetworks). Enterprise-registered addresses that appear in DMARC failure data are typically either compromised hosts on the organization's network or outbound mail relays that are not properly authorized in the domain's SPF record.
Across the wider spaceshipnetworks network, 14 distinct IPs have been associated with 203 authentication failures over 294 observed messages, spanning 1 country. The failure pattern suggests a mix of abuse sources on this network.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, treat it as probable spoofing. Verify that your SPF record does not authorize this host, directly or through nested include mechanisms, and that no DKIM selector you publish has been issued to it. If both checks come back clean, the receiver's reject action is doing its job.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for ORG-COD1-RIPE is listed in ARIN/RIPE/APNIC WHOIS records, though response from this jurisdiction is typically slow or unavailable due to regional routing policies.
Network Topology
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):
Nearby IPs
Other IPs in the 62.60.130.0/24 range observed failing DMARC:
62.60.130.76 (71 failures), 62.60.130.221 (16 failures), 62.60.130.165 (16 failures), 62.60.130.53 (14 failures), 62.60.130.142 (11 failures), 62.60.130.215 (9 failures), 62.60.130.59 (4 failures), 62.60.130.139 (3 failures)