Sh4mefulIP Address: 34.90.8.188
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- NL The Netherlands
- Region:
- Groningen
- City:
- Groningen
- Coordinates:
- 53.2222, 6.5664
WHOIS Information
- Network Name:
- GOOGL-2
- CIDR:
34.64.0.0/10- Owner:
- Google LLC
- Org ID:
GOOGL-2- Address:
- 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043
- Reverse DNS:
-
188.8.90.34.bc.googleusercontent.com
Last updated: 4/19/2026
Analysis
This IP was observed generating a single DMARC authentication failure on April 18, 2026. With only one data point, the event is better read as a single suspicious observation than a sustained campaign. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a reject disposition, refusing delivery outright.
The reverse DNS record (188.8.90.34.bc.googleusercontent.com) matches a generic cloud provider hostname pattern, indicating the host has not been specifically configured as mail infrastructure. Dedicated mail servers typically publish branded PTR records (mail.example.com, smtp.example.com) rather than default provisioning values.
Geolocation places the host in Groningen, The Netherlands, on infrastructure operated by Google LLC. Abuse-reporting channels in this jurisdiction are generally responsive, and reports to the network operator can result in timely remediation.
The address is hosted on Google LLC (GOOGL-2), a major cloud provider. Authentication failures are spread across multiple IP ranges on this network, which is consistent with the scale of a large provider's customer base.
Across the wider GOOGL-2 network, 91 distinct IPs have been associated with 94 authentication failures over 165 observed messages, spanning 5 countries. The failure pattern suggests a mix of abuse sources on this network.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, start with a misconfiguration investigation before assuming spoofing. Google's infrastructure is used by many legitimate senders, and auth failures here most often reflect a broken SPF include chain, a DKIM signing gap on a shared sending path, or a forwarding rule that breaks alignment. Verify that your authorized senders on Google are correctly publishing SPF and signing with DKIM before concluding the activity is malicious.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for Google LLC is listed in RIPE WHOIS records, and timely remediation is achievable through that channel.
Google, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
This is (part of) the GCP public cloud. Some email protection services run in GCP, but it is also an attack/spam vector.
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):