IP Address: 2600:1901:101:2::
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- US United States
- Coordinates:
- 37.751, -97.822
WHOIS Information
- Network Name:
- GOOGLE-CLOUD
- CIDR:
2600:1900::/28- Owner:
- Google LLC
- Org ID:
GOOGL-2- Address:
- 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043
- Reverse DNS:
-
x02-00.v6.unverified-forwarding.1e100.net
Last updated: 4/1/2026
Analysis
This IP was observed generating a single DMARC authentication failure on March 12, 2026. With only one data point, the event is better read as a single suspicious observation than a sustained campaign. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers took no enforcement action beyond reporting, indicating the sending domain's DMARC policy is set to p=none.
The reverse DNS record resolves to x02-00.v6.unverified-forwarding.1e100.net. Whether this represents legitimate mail infrastructure depends on whether the hostname aligns with the domains this address is claiming to send on behalf of.
Geolocation places the host in United States, on infrastructure operated by Google LLC. Abuse-reporting channels in this jurisdiction are generally responsive, and reports to the network operator can result in timely remediation.
The address is hosted on Google LLC (GOOGLE-CLOUD). While major cloud platforms carry large volumes of legitimate mail, concentrations of authentication failures on specific ranges often indicate either a compromised customer account or a pattern of abuse-tolerant customer behavior within that range.
Across the wider GOOGLE-CLOUD network, 57 distinct IPs have been associated with 133 authentication failures over 154 observed messages, spanning 5 countries. Most observed IPs on this network contribute to the failure count, suggesting the range as a whole warrants elevated scrutiny.
For IPv6 addresses, per-address blocking provides minimal protection. Cloud providers and large networks typically allocate a full /64 prefix (containing approximately 18 quintillion addresses) to each customer. An attacker assigned a /64 can rotate through effectively unlimited addresses within the same prefix at no cost. Blocking should target the /48 or /64 prefix rather than the individual address.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, start with a misconfiguration investigation before assuming spoofing. Google's infrastructure is used by many legitimate senders, and auth failures here most often reflect a broken SPF include chain, a DKIM signing gap on a shared sending path, or a forwarding rule that breaks alignment. Verify that your authorized senders on Google are correctly publishing SPF and signing with DKIM before concluding the activity is malicious.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. A p=none policy provides visibility but no enforcement, meaning mail is reported but not blocked. Moving to p=quarantine and then p=reject closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for Google LLC is listed in ARIN WHOIS records, and timely remediation is achievable through that channel.
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):