Sh4mefulIP Address: 196.202.46.10
This page shows DMARC authentication failure data for this IP address. Learn more about this data.
Geolocation Information
- Country:
- EG Egypt
- Region:
- Cairo Governorate
- City:
- Cairo
- Coordinates:
- 30.0507, 31.2489
WHOIS Information
No WHOIS data available
Analysis
This IP generated 4 messages that triggered DMARC failures on April 4, 2026, all within a single day. Every message observed from this source failed both SPF and DKIM verification. Receiving mail providers applied a reject disposition, refusing delivery outright.
The address has no reverse DNS record. Legitimate mail infrastructure almost always publishes a PTR record, because major receivers (Gmail, Microsoft 365, Yahoo) penalize or reject mail without one, and because it is a baseline operational hygiene expectation. Its absence, combined with authentication failure, is consistent with a host being used to originate spoofed mail rather than one misconfigured by a legitimate operator.
Geolocation places the host in Cairo, Egypt, on infrastructure operated by the hosting provider. Abuse-reporting channels exist in this jurisdiction but historical response rates are inconsistent, meaning remediation is more often handled through receiver-side blocking than provider-side takedown.
The network ownership for this address is not clearly identified in available registry data. This can occur for recently allocated blocks, private-use ranges, or addresses whose WHOIS records have not yet been processed.
If your domain appears in the From header of mail from this address, treat it as probable spoofing. Verify that your SPF record does not authorize this host, directly or through nested include mechanisms, and that no DKIM selector you publish has been issued to it. If both checks come back clean, the receiver's reject action is doing its job.
Your DMARC policy posture matters more than any IP-level response here. The enforcement action applied to this mail indicates your policy is already providing protection. Maintaining p=reject across all your domains closes the gap for attackers who manage partial alignment. Domains that remain at p=none long-term tend to be impersonated repeatedly, because the cost to the attacker of attempting is effectively zero.
Blocking this individual address has limited durability: an attacker can rotate to another address in the same /24 subnet at effectively zero cost. More durable responses include monitoring aggregate DMARC reports so new sources are visible as they emerge, tightening SPF to remove overly permissive include chains or +all mechanisms, and ensuring DKIM is signing every legitimate outbound stream so alignment failures are unambiguous. The formal abuse contact for the hosting provider is listed in AFRINIC WHOIS records, though response rates from this jurisdiction are inconsistent.
External Reputation Lookups
Look up this IP in external threat intelligence and reputation databases (opens in new tab):