DMARC Spoof Detection, Kazakhstan
Clear Clear FilterThis page shows DMARC authentication failures originating from Kazakhstan. Learn more about this data.
Kazakhstan accounts for 101 DMARC authentication failures observed by sh4meful over the observation window, sourced from 99 distinct IP addresses across 53 networks. This represents approximately 0.2% of total failure volume observed. Activity from Kazakhstan has declined over the last 30 days compared with the prior 30-day period. The most active source is GPON_FTTH_SERVICES with 21 failures across 21 IP addresses.
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Top Networks in Kazakhstan
Ten most active networks sourcing DMARC failures from Kazakhstan:
| Network | Organization | Failures | Distinct IPs | Top City |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPON_FTTH_SERVICES | — | 21 | 21 | Shymkent |
| GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT | — | 8 | 8 | Astana |
| pool-net-kos | — | 1 | 1 | Kostanay |
| MTNMCKAZAKTELECOMJSC | — | 7 | 7 | Oral |
| KZ-NLS | — | 4 | 3 | Talghar |
| RIPE | — | 5 | 5 | Almaty |
| KLINICHESK | — | 2 | 1 | Almaty |
| Internet_Company_First_Page | — | 2 | 2 | Pavlodar |
| KZ-KAZAKTELECOM-20071220 | — | 1 | 1 | Pavlodar |
| Customers_FTTB | — | 2 | 2 | Pavlodar |
GPON_FTTH_SERVICES and GPON_FTTH_SERVICES_KT together account for 34% of failure volume from this country. Distribution across many networks is consistent with commodity spoofing infrastructure operating from this geography.
Failure Activity Over Time
Peak activity was observed in the week of June 1, 2026 with 28 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window declined compared with the prior period (31 vs 55 failures).
Regional Context
Compared with peer geographies in Central Asia, Kazakhstan's failure volume is above the regional median. Countries in this region collectively contributed 0% of failures observed.
Failures
Showing 31-40 of 101 failures, affecting 157 messages| Date ▼ | Source IP | Country | City | Network | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6/9/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 | ||
| 6/8/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Aktobe | 2 | ||
| 6/2/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 | ||
| 6/1/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Kostanay | 12 | ||
| 6/1/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Taldykorgan | 13 | ||
| 6/1/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 | ||
| 6/1/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Ust-Kamenogorsk | 1 | ||
| 5/31/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Pavlodar | 2 | ||
| 5/29/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Aktobe | 1 | ||
| 5/28/2026 | KZ Kazakhstan | Astana | 1 |
What This Means
Country-level patterns don't imply that mail from Kazakhstan is inherently malicious. Many failures reflect misconfigured legitimate senders, forwarded messages that break authentication, or automated infrastructure operating without authorization. Domain owners investigating a specific failure should look at the source IP and network details rather than the country alone. Our DMARC guide explains how to interpret these signals in your own reports.