DMARC Spoof Detection, Kyrgyzstan
Clear Clear FilterThis page shows DMARC authentication failures originating from Kyrgyzstan. Learn more about this data.
Kyrgyzstan accounts for 29 DMARC authentication failures observed by sh4meful over the observation window, sourced from 25 distinct IP addresses across 11 networks. This represents approximately 0.3% of total failure volume observed. Activity from Kyrgyzstan has increased over the last 30 days compared with the prior 30-day period. The most active source is KYRGYZTELECOM_ADSL_PPPOE with 13 failures across 10 IP addresses.
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Top Networks in Kyrgyzstan
Ten most active networks sourcing DMARC failures from Kyrgyzstan:
| Network | Organization | Failures | Distinct IPs | Top City |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KYRGYZTELECOM_ADSL_PPPOE | โ | 13 | 10 | Bishkek |
| KYRGYZTELEKOM-PPPOE-OSH | โ | 6 | 6 | Osh |
| IUK-NET | โ | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| KRENA-NET | โ | 2 | 1 | โ |
| KTNET-JALALABAD-AREA | โ | 1 | 1 | โ |
| ALFA-TELECOM | โ | 1 | 1 | โ |
| SKYNET-TELECOM-KG-NET | โ | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| AUCA-KG | โ | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| KG-SKYNET-20160215 | โ | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
| MEGALINE | โ | 1 | 1 | Bishkek |
KYRGYZTELECOM_ADSL_PPPOE and KYRGYZTELEKOM-PPPOE-OSH together account for 73% of failure volume from this country. Concentration in a small number of networks suggests targeted infrastructure rather than diffuse compromise.
Failure Activity Over Time
Peak activity was observed in the week of August 3, 2026 with 7 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window increased sharply compared with the prior period (7 vs 4 failures).
Regional Context
Compared with peer geographies in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan's failure volume is below the regional median. Countries in this region collectively contributed 3% of failures observed.
Failures
Showing 1-10 of 29 failures, affecting 44 messages| Date โผ | Source IP | Country | City | Network | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8/6/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | 1 | ||
| 8/5/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | 1 | ||
| 8/5/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | 1 | ||
| 8/5/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Osh | 2 | ||
| 8/4/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Osh | 1 | ||
| 8/4/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Osh | 1 | ||
| 8/2/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | 1 | ||
| 8/2/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | 1 | |||
| 7/19/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | 1 | |||
| 7/7/2026 | KG Kyrgyzstan | Bishkek | 1 |
What This Means
Country-level patterns don't imply that mail from Kyrgyzstan is inherently malicious. Many failures reflect misconfigured legitimate senders, forwarded messages that break authentication, or automated infrastructure operating without authorization. Domain owners investigating a specific failure should look at the source IP and network details rather than the country alone. Our DMARC guide explains how to interpret these signals in your own reports.