DMARC Spoof Detection, Brazil
Clear Clear FilterThis page shows DMARC authentication failures originating from Brazil. Learn more about this data.
Brazil accounts for 193 DMARC authentication failures observed by sh4meful over the observation window, sourced from 176 distinct IP addresses across 111 networks. This represents approximately 0.6% of total failure volume observed. Activity from Brazil has held roughly steady over the last 30 days. The most active source is Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda with 22 failures across 21 IP addresses.
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Top Networks in Brazil
Ten most active networks sourcing DMARC failures from Brazil:
| Network | Organization | Failures | Distinct IPs | Top City |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda | — | 22 | 21 | Rio de Janeiro |
| TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A | — | 3 | 3 | Regente Feijó |
| BRISANET SERVICOS DE TELECOMUNICACOES S.A | — | 4 | 4 | Maceió |
| ACESSOLINE TELECOMUNICA??ES LTDA | — | 6 | 5 | São José dos Pinhais |
| TELEF?NICA BRASIL S.A | — | 5 | 5 | São Paulo |
| Alares Cabo Servicos de Telecomunicacoes S.A. | — | 5 | 5 | Taboão da Serra |
| V tal | — | 3 | 3 | Curitiba |
| VERO S.A | — | 4 | 3 | Cláudio |
| MUNDIVOX DO BRASIL LTDA | — | 5 | 4 | Rio de Janeiro |
| figueiredo provedores eireli | — | 3 | 2 | Montes Claros |
Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda and TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A together account for 20% of failure volume from this country. Distribution across many networks is consistent with commodity spoofing infrastructure operating from this geography.
Failure Activity Over Time
Peak activity was observed in the week of August 24, 2026 with 39 failures recorded. Activity in the most recent 30-day window held roughly steady compared with the prior period (86 vs 85 failures).
Regional Context
Compared with peer geographies in South America, Brazil's failure volume is above the regional median. Countries in this region collectively contributed 1% of failures observed.
Failures
Showing 1-10 of 193 failures, affecting 600 messages| Date ▼ | Source IP | Country | City | Network | Messages |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9/2/2026 | BR Brazil | Curitiba | 4 | ||
| 9/2/2026 | BR Brazil | Ourinhos | 3 | ||
| 9/1/2026 | BR Brazil | Ribeirão Preto | 4 | ||
| 9/1/2026 | BR Brazil | Paulo Afonso | 4 | ||
| 9/1/2026 | BR Brazil | São Domingos do Maranhão | 8 | ||
| 8/30/2026 | BR Brazil | 1 | |||
| 8/30/2026 | BR Brazil | Rio de Janeiro | 8 | ||
| 8/30/2026 | BR Brazil | São Carlos | 1 | ||
| 8/29/2026 | BR Brazil | São Paulo | 4 | ||
| 8/29/2026 | BR Brazil | Curitiba | 6 |
What This Means
Country-level patterns don't imply that mail from Brazil is inherently malicious. Many failures reflect misconfigured legitimate senders, forwarded messages that break authentication, or automated infrastructure operating without authorization. Domain owners investigating a specific failure should look at the source IP and network details rather than the country alone. Our DMARC guide explains how to interpret these signals in your own reports.